Hiroshima and the Nuclear Event
"The most spectacular event of the past half-century," Thomas Schelling announced in his Nobel Lecture of 2005, "is one that did not occur. We have enjoyed sixty years without nuclear weapons exploded in anger." To think of something that has not occurred as an event is slightly counterintuitive; to think of it as a spectacular event is downright bizarre. But Schelling's formulation sits more comfortably than we might expect within the animated and contentious discussion that has surrounded nuclear weapons from their initial explosion "in anger" in 1945 through their persistent "non-use" ever since. 1 The prospect of nuclear combat has regularly pressured the relationship between what Alan Nadel calls "history and event." 2 Jacques Derrida identified nuclear war as a "non-event," a prospect whose very conceptualization raised "the necessity and the impossibility of thinking the event." 3 If Schelling's casting something that did not occur as an event testifies to this necessity, accounts of what Derrida calls "the explosion of American bombs in 1945" (22) often betray the impossibility. "For most people who know something about the United States' intervention in the Second World War," Rey Chow announces at the opening of "The Age of World Target," "one image seems to predominate and preempt the rest: the dropping of the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, pictorialized in the now familiar image of the mushroom cloud, with effects of radiation and devastation of human life on a scale never before imaginable." 4 (See figures 1-2.) Given that Chow will go on to anatomize and to critique the "fuzzing of the line between war and representation" first, or at least definitively, enacted in the United States' detonation of atomic bombs over Japanese cities, we can only wonder at her casual and seamless movement from the "one image" that dominates all other images of the Second World War to "the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki" (32). That image, Chow tells us, is the "now familiar image of the mushroom cloud," but the order of her phrases presents the bombing itself as if it were the famous image, as if the bombing were in fact itself nothing more than the mushroom cloud that is also said to "pictorialize" it. Once the 1945 atomic attacks are rendered "representation" the world--"us, the spectators"--becomes their "target" (26). But the imperative to disentangle the historical event of the bomb's deployment from its terrorizing pictorialization receives expression here only as the two are further interarticulated. Schelling's event of non-occurrence has become Chow's non-event of occurrence.
Although it is tempting to read these equivocations in Chow's opening lines as a betrayal of her larger challenge to "a global culture in which everything has become (or is mediated by) visual representation and virtual reality" (26-27), my inclination is instead to see in them Chow's most powerful registration of the tenacious centrality of the virtual to the peculiar nature of nuclear warfare. In what follows I will suggest that the emergence of a specifically nuclear branch of strategic military thinking over the late 1940s and 1950s depended upon a thoroughgoing reconceptualization of the idea of the weapon and the event of its use. In its relentless reconsideration of these two categories, nuclear theory would largely anticipate the insights of the self-consciously deconstructive nuclear criticism that later arose to confront it. I will not go so far here as to insist that deconstruction itself should be seen as a progeny of postwar nuclear theory, but several its characteristic insights conspicuously percolate in the seemingly alien discourses of atomic strategy, where, if anything, they receive more committed expression than they would later find in nuclear criticism itself: the bomb brings out unexpected antifoundational valences in military analysis and similarly unexpected realist valences in poststructuralist critique.
The nuclear explosives dropped on Japan, according to Schelling, writing in 1966, "represented violence against the country itself." They "were weapons of terror and shock. They hurt, and they promised more hurt, and that was their purpose." "The bomb that hit Hiroshima was a threat aimed at all of Japan. The political target of the bomb was not the dead of Hiroshima or the factories they worked in, but the survivors in Tokyo." 5 It is easy to see why such weapons might lead Derrida to identify a scare-quoted "'reality'" as "the encompassing institution of the nuclear age" (23). These attacks' chief "effects" occur at the level of what Derrida calls "doxa, opinion, 'belief,'" rather than "science" (24). If the bombs insistently function by way of the application of a seemingly concrete "hurt," they are pitched, equally insistently, to the less concrete entity of "the country itself." And because their targets differ from their victims, they work as much by "representing violence" as inflicting it, which is why so much of their power stems from violence they do not impose but instead merely "promise." The "essential feature" of the nuclear warfare, according to Derrida, is "that of being fabulously textual, through and through" (23)--but Derrida's elaboration of this textuality is itself surprisingly literal in light of Schelling's claims. Because "nuclear war has no precedent," Derrida continues, "The terrifying reality of the nuclear conflict can only be the signified referent, never the real referent (present or past) of a discourse or a text" (23). 6 Schelling's nuclear textuality, by contrast, derives from the nuclear event's formal structure rather its relation to other events: what prevents the "reality" of nuclear weapons from emerging simply as a "real referent" in nuclear theory is not the novelty of the weaponry but the variety of domains in which it will be deployed--the bombs' "purpose" is as much "terror" as destruction. Both depending upon and exceeding the detonation of explosives, nuclear warfare will maintain a perpetually ambiguous and complicated relationship to the ordinary categories of action.
It will maintain, indeed, a perpetually ambiguous and complicated relationship even to the very idea of war. Chow is absolutely right, at the end of the day, to suggest that the "mushroom cloud" is also "the image of [the] blurring of the boundary between war and peace" (31-32). 7 But the atomic bomb's collapsing of war into peace must be read in terms of its reconfiguration of the term "war" as well its reconfiguration of "peace." Paul Virilio's category of "acts of war without war" cuts in two directions. 8 "The overwhelming effect of the continual imaging of" (Chow 33) nuclear weapons lies as much, I submit, in what Schelling would call a "tradition" of nuclear non-use as it does in the "disastrous" (Chow 33) extension of war into the modalities of the everyday. 9 We could easily reverse Derrida's proposition: nuclear weapons are not fabulously textual because they have not been frequently used; they have not been frequently used because they are fabulously textual. The "preemptive combat" (32) Chow associates with the nuclear age involves both a new form of military engagement and a thorough contracting of military agency. To stress the former is to overlook how unlikely it seemed in the immediate aftermath of the events of August 1945 that the development of nuclear weaponry would lead to anything remotely resembling the latter. 10 "There are no longer problems of the spirit," William Faulkner announced in his Nobel Acceptance speech in 1950. "There is only the question: When will I be blown up?" (649). 11 More hard-boiled military strategists were hardly more optimistic. In 1946 Bernard Brodie was sufficiently alarmed by the implications of the atomic bomb that he opened the first systematic academic analysis of the function of nuclear weapons as strategic military instruments by expressing hope that careful and patient deliberation would allow the world to "transmute what appears to be an immediate crisis into a long-term problem." 12 If Chow's age of world target amounts to nothing more than this long-term problem, we might consider it an achievement as well as a disaster.
I will outline out the terms of the disaster, or achievement, by juxtaposing John Hersey's Hiroshima (1946) to the nuclear theory of Brodie, Schelling, and other intellectuals associated with the RAND Corporation in the late 1940s and 1950s. On the surface at least, Hiroshima and the texts I will examine along with it could not be less similar, either in their basic conception of the threat posed by the advent of nuclear weapons or in their sense of the ethical obligations that threat places on those who try to write about it. The differences between an intensely focused account of the bomb's devastating effects on specific persons and abstract theoretical speculations about its strategic military implications are so obvious that they hardly need be noted. All the same, I hope to show that the bomb is already implicitly assuming in Hiroshima the form it would later take explicitly in the nuclear theory produced within the broad umbrella of RAND in the 1950s. For all of Hersey's publicly declared reportorial pride in his work's neutral realism, Hiroshima systematically elaborates the abstract nature of atomic military power even as it depicts that power's awful material implications for the inhabitants of Hiroshima. Hersey's contribution to Schelling's tradition of nuclear non-use stems as much from his recognition that nuclear power is not simply an effect of nuclear destructiveness as from his demonstration of how frightening that destruction could be. 13
1. The Noise of the Bomb
If the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have been relentlessly pictorialized, as Chow insists, the image of a mushroom cloud has not always served as their chief visual emblem. "The atomic bomb came and changed everything," Brodie declared in 1959. "[P]hotographs of the destruction wrought at Hiroshima and Nagasaki had been spread across the land, and few persons were unaffected by the thought that the damage had in each case been done by a single aircraft" (50). Brodie's images of rubble are closer to "mimetic representations" of "destruction" (Chow 26) than Chow's cloud, of course, but they are not especially good representations of nuclear destruction. Compare a conventional image of firebombed Tokyo (fig. 3) to an equally conventional shot of Hiroshima (fig. 4), and it is easy to recognize that the distinctive power of the image of Hiroshima lies not in the destruction we see but in the "thought" that accompanies it, namely that a single bomb could have generated such carnage.
In this sense, Chow's and Brodie's images should probably be understood as complements of one another rather than as competitors for the status of the hegemonic or definitive image of nuclear power in military action. As Brodie had already explained in The Absolute Weapon (1946), "the essential change introduced by the atomic bomb is not primarily that it will make war more violent—a city can be as effectively destroyed with TNT and incendiaries—but that it will concentrate the violence in terms of time" (71). Pictures of the rubble in Hiroshima show us an effectively destroyed city. Pictures of mushroom clouds show us something about how such devastation might be concentrated in time. That the clouds would gradually overshadow the rubble only intimates that over time the "thought" of nuclear force might gradually displace its physical application in the nuclear imagination.
Obviously, neither picture exactly presents the bomb's devastation in specifically human terms. The inhabitants of Hiroshima, living and dead alike, are usually as absent from images of the bombed city as they are from the images of the cloud that accompanied its devastation (fig. 5). 14
Such an absence might only seem appropriate in the case of a weapon designed to unleash violence on a "country itself" as well as, or instead of, the people and physical environments it destroys. In the spirit of Elaine Scarry's The Body in Pain (1985) we might find ourselves going so far as to entertain the thought that the bombing of Hiroshima has readily lent itself to "pictorialized" forms precisely because the images implicitly raise the questions about the relationship between war and violence which seem to lie at the heart of any understanding of nuclear combat. Photographs "may place the injured body several inches in front of our eyes," Scarry explains, but they "may not" "specify whether such an injury was the intent or accidental effect of the bombing, whether it was within or wholly outside the view" of the weapons' makers and designers, or, "most important, whether the populations who consented to war consented to this or to something else." 15 These latter questions have remained pressing with respect to Hiroshima in large part because the bodies attacked in early August 1945 have so frequently been detached in commentary from the "view" of the bomb's designers and from the intentions behind its use. It has often seemed that the bombings were conceived, from the very beginning, as what Brodie labeled "the initial demonstration" (AW 41) of nuclear power. "Japan was already defeated," he explained. "It was necessary only to make her government develop a clear consensus on that fact, and then openly concede it.... The awful terror of the great fire raids on the cities, culminating in the two atomic attacks, copiously provided the pressure" (SMA 131). As this communicative project sits very uneasily with the material results of two destroyed cities and hundreds of thousands of casualties, critics of the decision to drop the bombs on Japanese cities have frequently suggested that the United States should have instead given the demonstration a purer form. "The dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki clearly constituted war crimes in the sense of the Hague Convention," Hannah Arendt would maintain in the early 1960s; the United States' "entirely new and overwhelmingly powerful weapon" could "have been announced and demonstrated in many other ways." 16 But insofar as the impulse here is to start out with the mushroom cloud that the bombing of Hiroshima has become, it encounters interference from terms like "pressure" in Brodie's argument. In dropping the bombs the United States demonstrated more than that the bombs existed and that they were powerful; it also demonstrated that at least one nation was willing to use them in combat.
It would seem at first glance that that use is Hiroshima's principal subject, and that the work's overarching ambition is to show us that the events of August 6, 1945 were emphatically not the relatively empty demonstration Arendt would have preferred. It is certainly hard not to read Hiroshima as a reminder of the human stakes at issue in the deployment of atomic weaponry. The work often seems little more than an insistent commentary on the ease with which the bomb, spectacular in its power, impressive in its design, can be detached from its material impact. Hersey's opening paragraph is a veritable allegory of Chow's critique. The atomic bomb "flashe[s] over Hiroshima" (781) in the opening sentence, almost as if to illuminate the sky for a photograph of a beautiful mushroom cloud. Several sentences later the weapon's presence is considerably less ethereal: "One hundred thousand people were killed by the atomic bomb..." (782). Hiroshima's famously impassive tone gives way to judgment almost exclusively on the question of how thoroughly its characters persist in engaging the devastation around them. "It was difficult for the children in the park to sustain a sense of the tragedy" (824). Hersey himself has no such problems. He fairly glories in his tragic stamina by relentlessly scolding those of his characters who lack it:
The rector of the Novitiate, who had been a doctor before he entered the religious order, cleaned the wounds of the two priests and put them to bed between clean sheets, and they thanked God for the care they had received.
***
Thousands of people had nobody to help them. (820)
Injured bodies are never more than "several inches" from our eyes in Hiroshima, and Hersey's clever use of readerly surrogates imaginatively projects his readers into scenes from which they might otherwise think themselves aloof:
He reached down and took a woman by the hands, but her skin slipped off in huge, glove-like pieces. He was so sickened by this that he had to sit down for a moment.... Mr. Tanimoto, ashamed of hurting wounded people, embarrassed at being able to walk upright, suddenly thought of the naval hospital ship, which had not come (it never did), and he had for a moment a feeling of blind, murderous rage at the crew of the ship, and then at all doctors. Why didn't they come to help these people? (818)
If we are not so sickened by these images that we have to sit down, it is because we are likely already sitting down, unembarrassed, at least until this moment, that we will walk upright to our next appointment once we finish The New Yorker. And if we need not join Mr. Tanimoto in his feelings shame for hurting injured people, we are also denied the consolation Mr. Tanimoto can feel in complaining that help is not arriving. We have done little enough to help these people; our representatives made them need this help in the first instance.
It is nonetheless easy to overstate the significance of these sequences. Their force lies almost entirely in their subtlety. We get a delicious form of liberal guilt: the work's most powerful effects come bundled with an implicit compliment to the reader for his sensitivity. The process generates as much self-congratulation for one's ability to see through the images of Hiroshima to the horror of war as self-flagellation for one's complicity in bringing about this particular catastrophe: hard-earned tears of sorrow simply wash away responsibility. Whatever the moral stakes of the decision to drop the bomb, they are not so profound as to need announcing. They will surface only ambivalently in Hiroshima, and only in the mouths of characters ("When will our moralists give us a clear answer to this question?" [855]). In their place we find a curiously aggressive evasiveness about exactly what happened "At exactly fifteen minutes past eight in the morning, on August 6, 1945, Japanese time" (781). The bomb itself regularly disappears into Hersey's accounts of its effects. The flashing above Hiroshima occurs in a subordinate clause in Hiroshima's opening sentence, which is primarily focused on what Miss Toshiko Sasaki is doing when it happens. Most of "the survivors in Hiroshima," Hersey notes, "were too busy or too weary or too badly hurt to care that they were objects of the first great experiment in the use of atomic power" (821). His focus on their efforts, their exhaustion, and their injuries crowds out judgment about this experiment; indeed, it allows for the transformation of the bombing into an experiment without the reader's so much as pausing to wonder whether military actions and the scientific method should so seamlessly blur together. If Hersey is quick to attribute the idea that "no country except the United States, with its industrial knowhow ... could possibly have developed" the bomb to "voices on the shortwave" (821), he certainly does not meet such triumphalism with explicit questions about the moral implications of the United States' decision to use the weapon.
Indeed, there is a sense in which Hiroshima is no less devoted to obscuring that decision, and even that use, than it is to revealing the wounds and hardship they occasioned. Following Scarry, we might even say that attention to the wounds and the hardship they occasion is the very means by which Hersey will steer our attention away from the broader ethical implications of August 6th. Hersey comes remarkably close to saying so himself. "A surprising number of people remained more or less indifferent about the ethics of using the bomb," he writes. "Possibly they were too terrified by it to want to think about it at all. Not many of them even bothered to find out much about what it was like" (854). The phrase "what it was like" jumps off of the page here. The whole premise of Hiroshima, after all, is that while these survivors may not have known what the bomb was, they are the only ones who know what it was like: it is because they know what the bomb was like in an experiential sense that they need not pursue the question of what it was like in an ethical or military sense. But here the experience of the bomb comes at the expense not only of the consideration of the bomb as, to use Brodie's term, "an instrument of war" (24), but also of the consideration of the bomb as a bomb. The impact of atomic warfare is no longer irreducibly connected to the physical scenes of atomic deployment.
The point is not simply that Hersey sometimes detaches the grisly scenes on offer in Hiroshima from the strategic military decisions that produced them--in casting, for instance, the tasks facing the survivors as a "dreadful ordeal" (853), as if the victims of the bombing had simply run into a string of bad luck. It is rather that he will show how easily the bomb's very material effects can conceal its status as a weapon. His focus on survivors, on those whose lives persisted at least some considerable time beyond the moment of the bomb's flash, gently obscures the bomb's most obvious and immediate casualties: those killed by the explosion itself and those who died in "direct reaction to the bombardment of the body, at the moment when the bomb went off, by neutrons, beta particles, and gamma rays" (844). And the bomb's less direct effects frequently appear reconfigured in Hiroshima as the more direct effects of some intervening contingency. When we read something like, "The lot of Drs. Fujii, Kanda, and Machii right after the explosion...explained why so many who might have lived died. Of a hundred and fifty doctors in the city, sixty-five were already dead and most of the rest were wounded" (800-801), we are likely to forget that everyone who perished in Hiroshima might have lived. This kind of teasing displacement springs up throughout the work, perhaps most pointedly in Hersey's accounts of the effects of radiation sickness. "Since the blood disorders were, in the long run, the predominant factor in the disease," Hersey explains in a mesmerizing sequence, "some of the Japanese doctors evolved a theory as to the seat of the delayed sickness. They thought that perhaps gamma rays, entering the body at the time of the explosion, made the phosphorous in the victims' bones radioactive, and that they in turn emitted beta particles, which, though they could not penetrate for through flesh, could enter the bone marrow, where blood is manufactured, and gradually tear it down" (845). By the end of this description, the victim's body has itself become a source of the radioactive particles that kill him: the emission that tears down his bone marrow comes from his own bones. It is almost as if the bomb's power has become more replicative than explosive. Its force lies more in its ability to make its victims themselves redouble its operations than in its immediate detonative energy.
This insistent doubling of the bomb's effects—so that they that are done both to and by the characters in Hiroshima—allows Hersey to isolate the events of August 6th from the arena of the national military conflict in which they might seem to have taken place and relocate them in a broader sweep of a generally global human time. The paragraph beginning with the Japanese doctors' "theory" of "the delayed sickness" ends with a curious invocation of man's "own ingenuity": "And, as if nature were protecting man from his own ingenuity, the reproductive processes were affected for a time; men became sterile, women had miscarriages, menstruation stopped" (845). "Man" here is at least doubly distortive. That previously specifically American military knowhow has now somehow become the survivors' responsibility: their reproductive difficulties stand as nature's general solution to the bomb's and their enemies' horrific violence against them. And once the bomb has been removed from the scene of national conflict it can also be easily removed from the domain of human agency itself. 17
As the men and women of Japan and the United States are united as "man," ingenuity becomes a natural category, not a social or political one. Man is its victim in the general sense that it is a part of his nature, not in the specific sense that it leads particular groups of men to make unfortunate choices. It thus comes as no shock that the flashing of August 6th will seamlessly merge with the general patterns of the weather before Hiroshima has run its course: "Down in Hiroshima, the flood took up where the bomb had left off—swept away bridges that had survived the blast, washed out streets, undermined foundations of buildings that still stood" (839). This is how policy becomes an ordeal, how Brodie's "instrument of policy" can effect "visitations from a wrathful deity" (24).
The process lends credence to Mary McCarthy's insistence that Hiroshima refuses to confront "the question of intention and guilt--which is what made Hiroshima more horrifying, to say the least, than the Chicago Fire..." 18 But where McCarthy sees this reticence as evasive, I would suggest that it is at least partially strategic. Hiroshima does not so much fail to register moral considerations as reveal the terms under which such considerations would likely recede from our attention. McCarthy thought that in order to avoid "an insipid falsification of the truth of atomic warfare" Hersey "would have had to interview the dead." But Hersey's point is that the particular "horror" of Hiroshima may well disappear if we attend so carefully to its victims: can the chief moral difference between the Chicago Fire and the atomic bombings be found in the experiences of those who perished in the events? How exactly would their comments address the relevant "question of intention and guilt"? McCarthy's "horrifying" carries weight precisely because the event "Hiroshima" extends beyond the range of the bomb's material impact.
The point is on spectacular display in Hersey's account of the most significant consequence of the bomb's horror: the Japanese surrender. He sets the scene by invoking the tension between what he explicitly labels "a kind of symbolism" and the tragic sense he so often valorizes:
In Kabe, on the morning of August 15th, ten-year-old Toshio Nakamura heard an airplane overhead. He ran outdoors and identified it with a professional eye as a B-29. "There goes Mr. B." he shouted.
One of his relatives called out to him, "Haven't you had enough of Mr. B.?"
The question had a kind of symbolism. At almost that very moment, the dull, dispirited voice of Hirohito, the Emperor Tenno was speaking for the first time over the radio: "After pondering deeply the general trends of the world and the actual conditions obtaining in Our Empire today, We have decided to effect a settlement of the present situation by resorting to an extraordinary measure. . . ."
... "Have you heard the news?"
"What news?"
"The war is over."
"Don't say such a foolish thing, sister."
"But I heard it over the radio myself." And then, in a whisper, "It was the Emperor's voice." (834)
What exactly is the "symbolism" that Hersey has in mind here? Symbols so suffuse the sequence that it is hard to isolate any single one of them from the cluster as a whole. The first order of symbolism, of course, is the simple transformation of the bomber (and bombing) into Mr. B., a transformation that makes it possible, at least in part, for Toshio to feel wonder at the military systems that attacked him. The relative's question adds a new layer: the bombing of August 6th itself is reduced to the symbol of the flying plane, as if a photograph of a B-29, rather than a mushroom cloud, could stand in for what happened in Hiroshima that morning (fig. 6).
These layers of symbolism, of course, are superseded as Hersey's attention swings to the larger issue of the war as a whole—has Japan itself had enough of Mr. B.? The question has apparently received an answer in the affirmative, judging from Hirohito's statement. But to conceive of the end of the war in these terms is to make the final days of Japanese bombing every bit as symbolic as they become in Brodie's later explication. Morale in Hirsoshima is not driving the Emperor's decision; nor is any military incapacity stemming from the devastation. Whether actual survivors such as Toshio are tired of Mr. B. is beside the point. "[I]nsofar as the low morale of the Japanese people influenced the governmental decision to surrender, it did so in a quite passive way" (143), Brodie archly noted. The event "Hiroshima" leads to the surrender here entirely in terms of what it says about "general trends of the world" in relation to "actual conditions obtaining in Our Empire today." It matters as a sign. Toshio's childish symbolism is less an evasion of the bomb's status as a weapon than an acknowledgement of the importance of symbolism to the kind of weapon it is.
It is no accident, then, that Hiroshima's first chapter concludes with what Derrida might call a fabulously textual death: "There, in the tin factory, in the first moment of the atomic age, a human being was crushed by books" (794). The moment clearly presents itself as a sly acknowledgement of the ambivalent effects of Western knowledge, 19 but the remainder of Hiroshima makes such allegorical suggestions feel less urgent than what amounts, almost, to the sentence's literal point: the bomb whose explosion inaugurates this nuclear age functions as much as a book as an explosive device. And this in turn explains the role of such a clearly allegorical moment in the midst of a text otherwise so committed to its evenhanded realism: reality in nuclear Hiroshima is at least partially allegorical. 20 The upshot is an intense scrutiny of the complicated relationship between the experience of the bomb's physical effects and the appreciation of its meaning. People being crushed by books are not exactly plumbing those texts for messages:
Early that day, August 7th, the Japanese radio broadcast for the first time a succinct announcement that few, if any, of the people most concerned with its content, the survivors in Hiroshima, happened to hear.... Nor is it probable that any of the survivors happened to be tuned in on a short-wave rebroadcast of an extraordinary announcement by the President of the United States, which identified the new bomb as atomic.... [B]ut, even if they had known the truth, most of them were too busy or too weary or too badly hurt to care that they were objects of the first great experiment in the use of atomic power.... (821)
"So far as the populace was concerned," Brodie would explain, "few people outside the target areas had any real comprehension of what the [atomic] bombs meant ..." (140). But this "meaning" of the bomb, the converse of Hersey's "what it was like," has relatively little to do with the bomb's significance; the relevant messages will be "communicated" (AI 3) on another frequency: "Japan was already defeated. It was necessary only to make her government develop a clear consensus on that fact." Although the citizens of Hiroshima may have been the "objects" of the first nuclear bomb, to return to Hersey's terms, they were emphatically not the objects of "the first experiment in the use of nuclear power." Paradoxically, Schelling would note, if the goal is what Brodie called "the maximum of direct military pressure upon the population and the government" (131), then "What happens on the battlefield may be of only moderate interest" compared with its significance in the eyes of noncombatant observers (183). No wonder Hersey balances his complaint that these messages have been somehow diverted from the ears of "those most concerned with" their "content" with a persistent questioning of exactly why this content would much matter to the survivors in Hiroshima.
Hiroshima indeed sometimes so absorbs Schelling's notion that the "targets" of the Hiroshima bombing were not "the dead of Hiroshima" "but the survivors in Tokyo" that it places even some of the bomb's most immediate physical military effects beyond the purview of its victims in Hiroshima. If the messages surrounding the bomb go unheard in Hiroshima, so too does the bomb itself: "He heard no roar. (Almost no one in Hiroshima recalls hearing any noise of the bomb...)" (785). It is almost as if the roar itself has been routed through the airwaves, and Hersey drives the point home by suggesting that Hirohito will have to tell the survivors what the bomb should have made clear ("she needed nothing more to make her give up thinking, in spite of the atomic bomb, that Japan still had a chance to win the war" [834]). Hirohito's statement looms large in Hiroshima precisely because it marks the way in which military conflict itself has become an essentially mediated experience in 1945 Hiroshima. 21 Hersey's vigilant attention to war's violence has ultimately led to a powerful recognition of the ways in which war, at least in its nuclear form, always involves more than that violence.
2. Nuclear Promises
Bernard Brodie's insistence that we consider the "atomic bomb as instrument of war--and thus international politics--rather than a visitation from a wrathful deity" (24) coincided with a complicated, not to say downright bizarre, account of what kind of instrument it would be. The first step in conceptualizing the weapon, he thought, lay in recognizing what he called its "limitations." These limitations would prove surprisingly formidable, especially given the ease with which we might join Scarry in imagining that in the event of a nuclear monopoly a country's very "possession" of nuclear weapons might "require[] its opponents to capitulate to all of its wishes" (80). This scenario lies behind the Arendt-style fantasies of Japanese surrender by way of atomic demonstration, and indeed it goes further than Arendt in stressing the weapon's implicit power. In Scarry's scheme even a demonstration of the weapon is unnecessary; power would seem to follow, in Herman Kahn's terms, "as almost a simple philosophical consequence of the existence of thermonuclear bombs" (8). We could make do with a picture of Little Boy without even detonating it into a mushroom cloud (fig. 7).
In light of the bomb's future tradition of non-use there is obviously something plausibly intuitive about thinking that its power might proceed from its very existence, but almost the first move in nuclear theory would be to insist that, as Schelling put it, "The mere existence of nuclear weapons does not itself determine" military outcomes (24). For one thing, Henry Kissinger noted, one would need to show a given opponent that her "military strength [was] coupled with the willingness to employ it." 22 And though the problem of how to cultivate and express this willingness seemed pressing throughout the early years of the Cold War, even a combination of military strength and martial will could fail to induce the capitulation Scarry imagines. "On August 6 and 9, 1945 the United States dropped two atomic bombs on Japan," writes Nina Tannenwald, "ending World War II and inaugurating the nuclear age." 23 Tannenwald implies that the bombs themselves ended the war, but Hiroshima reminds us that the war stopped when Hirohito spoke, not when the bombs roared. If it seems obvious that the bombs played some role in getting him to speak, that they "copiously provided pressure," the relations between physical destruction and enemy acquiescence were by no means transparent during World War II and would indeed become less and less transparent the more military strategists thought about how to derive political power from nuclear military strength.
The "object of victory has traditionally been described as 'imposing one's will on the enemy,'" Schelling explained in the mid-1960s; "how to do that has typically received less attention than the conduct of campaigns and wars" (vi). "The difficulty" with early schemes for integrating nuclear weapons into military strategy, according to John Lewis Gaddis, "was their vagueness on just how the bomb could be made to produce the desired results." 24 The concern was only magnified by the bomb's association with the strategic bombing operations of World War II, which had been documented carefully enough so that a consensus could emerge after the war among military strategists that they had been largely ineffectual. By 1959 Brodie would confidently declare general bombing "the worst possible way to coerce states of relatively low military power, for it combines the maximum of indiscriminate destruction with the minimum of direct control" (98).
Indeed, so far as Brodie was concerned, the atomic bomb's very destructive power was itself the weapon's greatest limitation. "There is no doubt that there are extremely grave and far-reaching limitations" governing the use of atomic weapons, he explained in the mid-1950s. "But they lie not in the costliness of the weapons, in the difficulty of delivering them or in the finite boundaries of their destructive power. They stem, on the contrary, from their excessive destructive power. Excessive in terms of what? Their power is likely to be excessive in terms of any reasonable war objectives we might have." 25 Versions of this conundrum were sufficiently widespread in the 1950s that Kissinger could call it "the dilemma of the nuclear period" (7). Nuclear strategists would almost ritually note, to quote Herman Kahn, that as "force becomes increasingly more available, and increasingly more dangerous to use" it also becomes "in practice increasingly unusable" (3). Many commentators traced the problem to essentially moral sources--the "horror" (Kahn 126) of nuclear destructive power would make civilian leaders "reluctant" (Kissinger 3) to employ it. But Brodie's nuclear limitations derived from strategic considerations. "'No war is begun,'" Brodie quoted Clausewitz, "'or at least no war should be begun if people have acted wisely, without first finding an answer to the question: what is to be attained by and in war?'" (53). What ends could nuclear destruction advance? While "Warfare should be a means to an end other than warfare," George Kennan wrote in 1950, the use of nuclear weapons "cannot really be reconciled with a political purpose directed to shaping, rather than destroying, the lives of the adversary." 26
When "the atomic bomb came and changed everything," then, it did not radically expand the military capabilities of those nations fortunate enough to develop it. Its effect actually worked in the opposite direction: rather than making it easier for certain nations to win wars, Brodie concluded, the atomic bomb instead made it impossible for them to wage them, or at least impossible for them to wage them without radically limiting the terms of their military commitment. In what quickly emerged as the most significant sequence in The Absolute Weapon, Brodie announced that a proper nuclear strategy would pay no attention to question of "who will win the next war in which atomic bombs are used." "Thus far," he explained, "the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose" (76).
This shift had the counterintuitive effect of greatly enhancing the military relevance of nuclear weapons--the new instruments quickly assumed a pivotal role in helping us to avert the wars they could not help us win. They would assume this role, paradoxically, precisely because they would themselves serve as the occasion for any significant future military conflicts. That we would have no need to deploy such weapons in a military theatre did not exactly mean that the weapons were obsolete. Others might not be quite so conscientious in calibrating their weapons' destructive power to their strategic ends. Indeed, according to Brodie at least, they might even, "reasonably," conclude that our destruction would be worth the "very considerable price" a full-on nuclear assault might entail. "We have to remember that the Soviets have a very high incentive for destroying us, or at least our military power, if they can do so—the incentive of eliminating what is to them a great threat..." (SMA 281). To the extent that "the existence of nuclear weapons" serves as the "chief stimulus" to an enemy's attack (356), we might well decide that our safety depends less on the development of nuclear weaponry than the disavowal of it. Why preserve a military capacity, tactically useless to us, whose most likely effect would be to encourage our enemies to target us for destruction? 27 Hence, even in the midst of the American nuclear monopoly, Gaddis has noted, Kennan would speculate that a universal ban on the use of nuclear weapons would be in the nation's interest: "it would perhaps be best for this country, if it were decided that atomic bombs would never be used." 28
But so far as Brodie is concerned, it is not the possession of nuclear weapons but rather the very possibility of such weapons that generates the difficulty. The minute a potential conflict emerges between an advanced industrial state with nuclear weapons and another without them, he maintains, there is every incentive for the nuclear power to deploy its nuclear weapons as rapidly as possible: since the conflict would only give the rival an incentive to develop the weapons, why not strangle that threatening child in its crib? Nor will a universal nuclear ban work any better. Even if neither side possesses nuclear weapons, the conflict itself will stimulate both to develop them; "the race to get the bomb would not be an even one" (AW 84), and with that we will find ourselves back in the scenario in which one side has the weapons and a "very high incentive" to use them as soon as possible. What eliminates this "incentive" (301) to use the weapons will only be "a fear of their reciprocal use," and hence "a war in which atomic bombs are not used is more likely to occur if both sides have bombs in quantity from the beginning than if neither side has it at the outset or if only one side has it" (AW 85). So while nuclear weapons are in some important senses the source of the tense conflict between the US and the USSR, they are also the best, indeed the only, way of managing that conflict: "Known ability to defend our retaliatory force constitutes the only unilaterally attainable situation that provides potentially a perfect defense of our home land" (185). The counterintuitive notion that only the vigorous development and defense of the very weapons that might stimulate attacks against us can serve as a "perfect defense of our home land" lies at the center of Brodie's nuclear strategy. His claim that "our military establishment" "can have almost no other useful purpose" than averting wars comes on the heels of an admonishment that we keep our nuclear weapons well protected: "Thus, the first and most vital step in any American security program for the age of the atomic bomb is to take measures to guarantee to ourselves in case of attack the possibility of retaliation in kind" (76).
If it is hard to see the nuclear weapon as instrument of national policy here, the difficulty stems in no small part from the way in which the weapon has become the goal of that policy. We will not be using nuclear weapons to further our interests; our primary interest will be to protect our weapons. The most "important immediate objective" of any well-designed nuclear defense strategy, according to Schelling, is "the safety of weapons rather than the safety of people." And now that weapons have emerged as the chief object of any sound defense strategy, the way we conceive of their proper targets will undergo a similar modification. So far as Schelling was concerned, "A weapon that can hurt only people, and cannot possibly damage the other side's striking force, is profoundly defensive." Such a weapon "provides its possessor no incentive to strike first." The "weapon that is designed or deployed to destroy 'military' targets," by contrast, "can exploit the advantage of striking first and consequently provide a temptation to do so" (SC 233). 29 The paradox of the defensive weapon of terror is really just a microcosm of the larger paradox of deterrence itself. Schelling's argument that instruments designed only to kill people are paradigmatically defensive weapons depends upon the assumption that they will never have to be deployed. "Deterrence now means something as a strategic policy," Brodie explains, "only when we are fairly confident that the retaliatory instrument upon which it relies will not be called upon to function all" (272). The result is an enormous amount of effort to create and maintain a machine whose very point is its own obsolescence: "we expect the system to be always ready to spring while going permanently unused" (272). "[W]hat national defense is about in the thermonuclear age" is "spending" billions of dollars on possible responses to contingencies that are "utterly improbable," with an understanding, or at least a hope, that these expenditures will "mak[e] such situations still more improbable" (297-298).
Any scheme that depends so thoroughly upon what Schelling calls "the threat of force" in order to avoid "the application of force" (9) is bound to seem slightly strange. "Surely there is something almost unreal about this," Brodie sighs (272). 30
But the problem at issue here is even deeper than Brodie lets on, for the very structure of our deterrent system itself partakes of the unreality that characterizes its strategic posture. It is not simply the case that we hope that we will not have to use our weapons, and not even the case that we hope that our guaranteeing the operational functionality of those weapons will itself help make them superfluous. Even in the face of the contingency for which they were created we would still not want to use them in the way that our deterrent threats suggest. According to Brodie, the best way of "achieving the maximum deterrent effect from our retaliatory force before hostilities" would be to "assign the hard-core elements in our retaliatory force to the enemy's major cities, provide for the maximum automaticity as well as certainty of response, and lose no opportunity to let the enemy know that we have done these things...." But "what looks like the most rational deterrence policy involves commitment to a strategy of response which, if we ever had to execute it, might then look very foolish" (291-292). 31What makes such aggressive nuclear retaliation potentially a "foolish" strategy of response? Certainly humanitarian considerations would loom large in this connection. "Given the power of modern weapons," Kissinger insisted, "a nation that relies on all-out war as its chief deterrent imposes a fearful psychological handicap on itself.... [A]ll pressures will make for hesitation, short of a direct attack threatening national existence" (133). But we will have misgivings about nuclear retaliation whether or not we are particularly concerned with the humanitarian implications of our choice. We ended up in the unreal hall of mirrors of our deterrence strategy, after all, precisely because we recognized that "the destructive power" of nuclear weapons is "likely to be excessive in terms of any reasonable war objectives we might have." Kissinger acknowledged that "short of a direct attack threatening national existence" statesmen "will be inhibited by the incommensurability between the cost of the war and the objective in dispute" (144). Why would the incommensurability perish in an attack? If "the President's anger abates long enough for him to consider the situation," Kahn noted, "he will realize that there is no way to undo the damage that is done and that revenge may appear to make less sense than trying to make the best of a bad situation" (170-171). And once a strategic response to the situation reclaims its central role in our nuclear decision making process the bomb's limitations are likely once again to govern its use. So long as we retain any interest and the enemy retains any military capacity, Brodie thought, we will probably find that our over-powerful nuclear weapons will have more coercive authority as threats against future aggression than as destructive agents. Even in the midst of ongoing nuclear combat, the bomb's greatest authority would remain largely virtual: "[I]n a thermonuclear war the mere ability to destroy cities may well confer more military advantage than the destruction of them" (292-293). 32
There is an obviously defensive and self-protective dimension to this extension of deterrence "into war itself" (191), to use Schelling's terms, and it would be easy to see it as little more than a new elaboration of Brodie's previous claim that military strategy in the nuclear age would focus on avoiding wars rather than winning them. But Brodie's emphasis is less on minimizing casualties than maximizing "military advantage": the relevant danger is foolishness, not brutality. Nor would analysts eager to prosecute nuclear war, rather than evade it, see much military advantage in destroying cities. 33 Threats depend upon the existence of the interests at which they are directed: the bomb's power seemed so parasitic of its targets' value that even nuclear aggression would operate most effectively without nuclear deployment. "Cities," Schelling explained, are "not merely targets to be destroyed as quickly as possible to weaken the enemy's war effort, to cause anguish to surviving enemy leaders, or to satisfy a desire for vengeance after all efforts at deterrence had failed." Instead, "live cities" should "be appreciated as assets, as hostages, as a means of influence over the enemy himself." A strategy built around the actual destruction of cities "would abandon the principal threat by which the enemy is to be brought to terms." Once the target becomes as much a "means of influence" as the weapon, the detonation of nuclear warheads in combat becomes almost indistinguishable from the disarming of them (191).
"There is a difference," Schelling maintains, "between taking what you want and making someone give it to you.... It is the difference between defense and deterrence, between brute force and intimidation, between conquest and blackmail, between action and threats" (2). 34 For all of their "excessive destructive force," nuclear weapons do not work on the "brute force" side of these distinctions. "Peculiarly suited to the creation of pain and damage and fright," they will be used, "wittingly or unwittingly, to hurt, to intimidate, to coerce" (177). 35 Their military power is thus crucially dependent upon the collaboration of their putative targets: "Hurting, unlike forcible seizure or self-defense, is not unconcerned with the interest of others" (2). Terms such as "pain" and "hurt" move to the center of Schelling's discussion precisely because they transfer the material effects of nuclear weapons into the psychological realm in which the weapons' real work will be done. Pain "is measured," Schelling explains, both "in the suffering it can cause and the victims' motivations to avoid it." And even this emphasis on pain slightly overstates the significance of nuclear violence in Schelling's scheme of effective nuclear warfare. In invoking the "interests of others," coercion also alters the temporality of combat. "To inflict suffering gains nothing and saves nothing directly; it can only make people behave to avoid it" (2). Nuclear coercive power thus derives not from effective deployment but from the suggestion of future initiative: "It is the threat of damage, or of more damage to come, that can make someone yield or comply. It is latent violence that can influence someone's choice" (3).
This is why Schelling so aggressively ties the "hurt" inflicted by the "bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki" to the "promise" of "more hurt." The conversion of hurt into promise transforms the "brute strength" of the bomb into "terror and shock." It also relocates the agency of the nation's nuclear arsenal from its violence to its "latent violence." So long as our goal is chiefly what Kennan called "shaping the lives" of our adversaries, violence itself, Kennan's "destroying," will be relatively useless, except insofar as it makes a given "threat a lively one" (AI 195). Although "the power to hurt is often communicated by some performance of it" (3), the communication is more important than the performance: "it is not the pain and damage itself but its influence on somebody's behavior that matters. It is the expectation of more violence that gets the wanted behavior, if the power to hurt can get it at all" (3). Nuclear weapons thus "make war less military" (22). "'[V]ictory' inadequately expresses what a nation wants from its military forces," Schelling concluded. "Mostly it wants, in these times, the influence that resides in latent force. It wants the bargaining power that comes from its capacity to hurt, not just the direct consequence of successful military action" (31). 36
The notion that the non-use of nuclear weaponry amounts to the paradigmatic act of nuclear warfare casts Schelling's "tradition" of nuclear restraint in a new light. If nuclear power is "peculiarly suited" to coercive gestures as opposed to combative missions, we may begin to doubt that the nuclear states refrained from using their nuclear weapons during the Cold War in any ordinary sense of the term. 37 Refraining from using nuclear weapons, after all, is the proper way to use them--which is why the sixty-five years after Hiroshima have offered both the terror of Chow's age of world target and the "great good fortune" of Schelling's nuclear hiatus. 38 Obsessively centered on the disalignment of nuclear agency from nuclear combat, the nuclear imagination simultaneously expands and contracts the incidence of nuclear violence. "If the occurrence of violence does not always bespeak a shrewd purpose," Schelling explains, "the absence of pain and destruction is no sign that violence was idle. Violence is most purposive and most successful when it is threatened and not used" (10). We may well wonder how "violence" would be "most purposive and most successful" "when it is not used." Presumably "when it is not used" means something like "when it remains latent." 39 But we are left with a strange scenario in which violence manages not to be "idle" at the same time that it "is not used"--a description that would make sense only if we imagined that atomic weapons, in their hybrid state of non-idle non-use, were in and of themselves a form of violence.
Yet even as violence comes to attend the very existence of nuclear weapons it also remains strangely divorced from their actual deployment. "Nobody quite knows what happens if one country explodes a nuclear weapon in an enemy country" (195), Schelling claimed in 1960. It would probably be going to far to say that Schelling has simply forgotten about the "bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki"; he is almost certainly thinking here about a scenario, unlike the last days of World War II, in which both combatants would have recourse to nuclear weaponry. And while it is nonetheless quite striking that the analyst most concerned with the "tradition" of nuclear warfare would so casually overlook the attacks of 1945, there is a sense in which he never quite identified those bombs with their "explosions" in the first place. Their "pain" having quickly bled into the promise of "more to come," the World War II bombs would engage Schelling at the level of their political targets rather than their tactical victims. And once the relevant consideration is the promise of violence in the future and the attendant question of whether it has been properly communicated, it becomes slightly more understandable that one would lose sight of the fact that "the power to hurt" may well have been "communicated by some performance of it" and that what has been threatened is not violence but "more violence." 40 Nobody quite knows what happens if one country explodes a nuclear weapon in an enemy country because nuclear explosions so easily blur into their effects. This moment is in effect Schelling's version of Hersey's silent nuclear blast.
In the closing lines of Hiroshima Hersey reproduces a brief "matter-of-fact essay" (855) written by Toshio Nakamura recounting his experiences of August 6th. Toshio details a moment in which, as Hersey had first presented it some thirty pages earlier, "one of the city's gas-storage tanks went up in a tremendous burst of flame" (821) on the evening of the bombing. In Hersey's telling, Toshio's fascination with the explosion had emblematized a general sense of distraction surrounding the rescue efforts at Asano Park. Toshio's attention focused not on the burning tank itself so much as its "reflection in the river," and his excitement in the presence of this image is juxtaposed to Mr. Tanimoto's failure, in his exhaustion, to carry several "festered, limp bodies high enough on the sandpit" so that they would not be swept away by the rising tide. We are hardly shocked, then, that the unfortunate result--drowned "bodies floating in the river" (821)--is absent from Toshio's essay, where the river offers only a burning reflection for our consideration. Toshio effectively stands for the process whereby tragedy is displaced by spectacle. And in giving the final lines of Hiroshima to Toshio Hersey conjures the ease with which his own somber presentation of atomic horror might give way to less responsible forms of remembrance. If Hiromshima's "cognizance of itself as a document, is strikingly marked on the last pages," as Nadel has noted, 41 its recognition of the possibility that documents may evade important historical considerations is no less strikingly marked.
But the status of these evasions is by no means clear-cut. Little Boys are after all not simply little boys in Hiroshima. Hiroshima itself has offered up reflections of burning gas tanks as well as accounts of exploding bombs, and it has often suggested that such shifts from war's material consequences to its spectacular effects reveal the way atomic military power works even as they might seem to evade that power's ethical implications. In this sense we may see the substitution of Toshio's account for Hersey's as a part of a broader process of substitution of throughout the text, one in which events regularly morph into documents. Hiroshima begins and ends with Little Boys, and if it betrays misgivings about replacing the bomb's record of devastation and destruction with Toshio's story of exhilaration, it nonetheless underscores how difficult it would be to disentangle either of the two from the other, how difficult, that is, it would be either to reduce nuclear warfare simply to the event of nuclear deployment (Derrida's impossibility) or to abstract it entirely from such events (Derrida's necessity). 42 Hersey's narrative has translated the seemingly empirical fact of a nuclear explosion into the precedent that nuclear weaponry had an irreducibly virtual application. This is the sense in which Hiroshima offers the definitive record of the ways in which atomic weapons are too destructive ever to be used. "The pattern of the use of atomic weapons was set at Hiroshima," Robert Oppenheimer maintained. 43 Hiroshima helped perform the unlikely service of making that pattern a pattern of non-use.
Deak Nabers is Associate Professor of English at Brown University. He adds in acknowledgment:
I presented a preliminary version of this argument at the Post•45 Conference at the University of Missouri in the fall of 2009, where it met with helpfully spirited resistance. Although I doubt that my subsequent revisions will have met all of their objections, I am grateful to the conference participants for their engagement with the project. Challenges and suggestions from Amy Hungerford (on Hersey and trauma), Deborah Nelson (on Hersey and Mary McCarthy), Sean McCann (on the ethical stakes of Schelling's celebration of the nuclear stalemate), and Dan Grausam (on the intense nuclear activity that accompanied the Cold War's mode of nuclear non-use) significantly refined my thinking about several of the topics under discussion here; and rejoinders from Michael Szalay and Oren Isenberg led me to reshape parts of the argument from the ground up. I am also indebted to Oren, Abigail Cheever and Florence Dore for insightful comments on a later draft of the piece, to the members of the Brown English summer workshop program (Angela Allan, Austin Gorman, David Liao, Jeff Neilson, Sara Osment, and Jennifer Schnepf, in particular) for their vigorous responses to that draft, and to Joseph Stadolnik for helping me prepare the manuscript for the Post•45 webpage.
Works Cited
Arendt, Hannah. Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. New York: Viking, 1963.
Battaille, Georges. "Concerning the Accounts Given by the Residents of Hiroshima." In Trauma: Explorations in Memory, ed. Cathy Caruth. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995.
Boyer, Paul. By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age. New York: Pantheon, 1985.
Brodie, Bernard. "Nuclear Weapons: Strategic or Tactical?" Foreign Policy 32.2 (Jan., 1954). 217-29.
--. Strategy in the Missile Age. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959.
Chow, Rey. The Age of the World Target: Self-Referentiality in War, Theory, and Comparative Work. Durham: Duke University Press, 2006.
Derrida, Jacques. "No Apocalypse, Not Now (full speed ahead, seven missiles, seven missives)." Trans. Catherine Porter and Philip Lewis. Diacritics 14:2 (Summer 1984): 20-31.
Dunn, Frederick S., Bernard Brodie, Arnold Wolfers, Percy E. Corbett, and William T.R. Fox. The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order. Ed. Bernard Brodie. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1946.
Gaddis, John Lewis. The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.
Ghamari-Tabrizi, Sharon. The Worlds of Herman Kahn. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005.
Faulkner, William. The Portable Faulkner. Ed. Malcolm Cowley. 1946; rev. ed., New York: Penguin, 2003.
Hersey, John. Hiroshima. In Reporting World War II, Part Two: American Journalism, 1944-1946. New York: Library of America, 1995.
Kahn, Herman. On Thermonuclear War. 1960; New Brunswick: Transaction, 2007.
Kissinger, Henry. Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. New York: Harper and Row, 1957.
Lifton, Robert Jay, and Greg Mitchell. Hiroshima in America: Half a Century of Denial. New York: Harper, 1996.
Macdonald, Dwight. "Hersey's Hiroshima." Politics 3.10 (October, 1946): 308.
McCarthy, Mary. "The Hiroshima New Yorker." Politics 3.11 (November 1946): 367.
Nadel, Alan. Containment Culture: American Narratives, Postmodernism, and the Atomic Age. Durham: Duke University Press, 1995.
Scarry, Elaine. The Body in Pain: Making and Unmaking the World. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985.
Schelling, Thomas C. Strategies of Conflict. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960.
--. Arms and Influence. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.
--. "Nobel Address." In Micromotives and Macrobehavior.1978; rev. ed., Norton: New York, 2006.
Tannenwald, Nina. The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
Virilio, Paul and Sylvere Lortinger. Pure War. Trans. Mark Polizzotti, 1983; Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2008, 40.
Zuckerman, Solly. Nuclear Illusion and Reality. New York: Viking, 1982.
References
- #1 Thomas Schelling, "Nobel Address," in Micromotives and Macrobehavior (1978), rev. ed. (Norton: New York, 2006), 247, 251.[⤒]
- #2 Alan Nadel, Containment Culture: American Narratives, Postmodernism, and the Atomic Age (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995), 39.[⤒]
- #3 Jacques Derrida, "No Apocalypse, Not Now (Full Speed Ahead, Seven Missiles, Seven Missives)," Diacritics 14:2 (Summer 1984): 22, 29; hereafter cited essay in parentheses in the body of the essay.[⤒]
- #4 Rey Chow, The Age of the World Target: Self-Referentiality in War, Theory, and Comparative Work (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), 26; hereafter cited in parentheses in the body of the essay.[⤒]
- #5 Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 17-18; hereafter cited in parentheses in the body of the essay.[⤒]
- #6 Needless to say, Derrida's relatively straightforward invocation of the idea of a "real referent" comes as a jolt: "il n'y a pas de hors-texte"? And while Derrida ramps up the intensity of his claim at other moments, he never quite takes the point as far as Schelling would: "nuclear war is not only fabulous because one can only talk about it, but because the extraordinary sophistication of its technologies--which are also the technologies of delivery, sending, dispatching, of the missile in general, of mission, missive, emission, and transmission, like all techne--the extraordinary sophistication of these technologies coexists, cooperates in an essential way with sophistry, psycho-rhetoric, and the most cursory, the most archaic, the most crudely opinionated psychagogy, the most vulgar psychology" (24). Leave aside for the moment the question of whether the various game theoretical models of psychology operative in postwar nuclear theory should be considered more "archaic" and "vulgar" than the largely Freudian framework with which Derrida would replace them. If Derrida correctly intuits that, as Herman Kahn would put the point, "deterrence is a psychological phenomenon" (On Thermonuclear War [1960; New Brunswick: Transaction, 2007], 446), Schelling would consider even the act of nuclear combat an essentially psychological endeavor--inhering in promise and representation as much as actual destruction. His missiles do not simply coexist with missives or cooperate with them; they are missives. In the nuclear imagination, according to Nadel, the "substitution" of historical "records" for "the composite of unrecorded activity" "claims to capture or represent events, but instead replaces them with language" (38). The opposition would seem to exclude the possibility of an event that would work through language rather than be replaced by it. Such "performatives" (23), as Derrida calls them, hover in the rhetoric of this kind of nuclear criticism without ever being brought into its core. They are, however, precisely the core of nuclear theory itself.[⤒]
- #7 For much of her essay, Chow resists the "fuzzing of the line between war and representation" she sees as emblematic of the nuclear age on the grounds that a such a "virtualization of the world" (34) enables military violence--logistically enables it insofar as the incorporation of sophisticated imaging technologies into military machinery has allowed for the projection of military operations over greater distances (32) and psychologically enables it insofar as this distancing shields military actors from a direct encounter with the results of their seemingly "effortless" (32) actions. In a world of "seeing-as-destruction" (34) destruction will at the same time be remarkably easy (involving nothing more than "the skills of playing video games" [35]) and remarkably remote (physical confrontation having given way to "the logistics of perception" [32]). The visual terror at stake in her opening paragraph, however, does not stem from violence made possible by complicated imaging technologies; it instead looms in the images themselves. The problem arises not so much because we are seen as because we are seeing. My sense is that what looks like tension between these two different kinds of visual warfare in Chow's argument might better be described as a tension between the two different levels on which nuclear weapons are generally seen to operate. Chow can move from complaints about the warfare enabled by enhanced techniques of visualization and targeting ("seeing-as-destruction") to the warfare carried out through the dissemination of images ("signs of terror" [26]) precisely because nuclear weapons themselves seem to oscillate between the two registers. That nuclear weapons operate in both registers, though, does not make the registers identical. The interest of nuclear theory lies in the tension between these two fields of application--a tension more enacted in Chow's argument than accounted for by it.[⤒]
- #8 Paul Virilio and Sylvere Lortinger, Pure War, trans. Mark Polizzotti (1983; Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2008), 40.[⤒]
- #9 Thomas C. Schelling, Strategies of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), 260; hereafter cited in parentheses in the body of the essay.[⤒]
- #10 The best historical account of this mindset is Sharon Ghamari-Tabrizi, The Worlds of Herman Kahn (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005). See, esp., 46-60 and 83-148. See also Paul Boyer's earlier discussions of what he calls "atom bomb nightmares" in By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age (New York: Pantheon, 1985), 33-46).[⤒]
- #11 William Faulkner, The Portable Faulkner, ed. Malcolm Cowley (1946; rev. ed., New York: Penguin, 2003), 646.[⤒]
- #12 Bernard Brodie et al., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1946), 23; hereafter cited in parentheses in the body of the essay. By 1959 his hopes had been largely realized, though he was adamant that the problem had not ended with the crisis: "The old attitude that total war is inevitable has now given way in many quarters that it is impossible" (Strategy in the Missile Age [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959], 230); hereafter cited in parentheses in the body of the essay.[⤒]
- #13 All references to John Hersey, Hiroshima (1946), in Reporting World War II, Part Two: American Journalism, 1944-1946 (New York: Library of America, 1995), will appear in parentheses in the body of the essay. My hope is to confine my analysis as much as possible to the text of Hiroshima, rather than the phenomena of its publication and reception, but it should certainly be noted that the work's immediate impact of postwar American cultural life was truly phenomenal. Hiroshima was first published as the entire August 31, 1946 issue of The New Yorker; it remains to this day the only item ever to have received such treatment in those pages. "I don't think I've ever got so much satisfaction out of anything else in my life," Harold Ross would later say of his decision to give over an entire issue to Hersey's piece. The public response certainly would have given him no reason to doubt his judgment. The Hiroshima issue sold out within hours of its first appearance on newsstands, so quickly, alas, that the publishers could not fulfill Albert Einstein's personal request for one thousand copies for distribution to prominent nuclear scientists; the ABC Radio network set aside regular programming to present a reading of the entire article over four separate half-hour sessions (the programs would receive the 1946 Peabody for Educational Programming); and the Book of the Month Club immediately picked up the piece as a pro bono selection ("We find it hard to conceive of anything being written that could be of more importance at this moment to the human race," the club's director, Harry Scherman, wrote in a note accompanying the volume). In book form Hiroshima would sell over three million copies; it has remained continuously in print since its first appearance. See Boyer, 203-210.[⤒]
- #14 While they were comparatively lenient with respect to images of architectural destruction in Hiroshima, U. S. occupying forces in Japan diligently censored images of human casualties in the city. See Robert Jay Lifton and Greg Mitchell, Hiroshima in America: Half a Century of Denial (New York: Harper, 1996), 8-107.[⤒]
- #15 Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: Making and Unmaking the World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 65; hereafter cited in parentheses in the body of the essay.[⤒]
- #16 Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: Viking, 1963), 256.[⤒]
- #17 It is in this spirit that I would read the famous sequence in which Hersey runs the Japanese expression of resignation, "Shikata ga nai," through three other languages:
As for the use of the bomb, she would say, "It was war and we had to expect it." And then she would add, "Shikata ga nai," a Japanese expression as common as, and corresponding to, the Russian word "nichevo": "It can't be helped. Oh, well. Too bad." Dr. Fujii said approximately the same thing about the use of the bomb to Father Kleinsorge one evening, in German: "Da ist nichts zu machen. There's nothing to be done about it." (854-855)
This widely expressed sense of resignation, rather than condemnation, depends precisely upon its wide expression--on the idea that the "use of the bomb" does not have nationally particular targets or nationally particular strategic implications (thus the pointed insertion of Russian).[⤒]
- #18 Mary McCarthy, "The Hiroshima New Yorker," Politics 3.11 (November 1946): 367.[⤒]
- #19 "An initiating mark of the 'atomic age,'" Nadel notes, "is that books serve a new function, one that suggests a reversal in the evolutionary model by which intellectual processes replace brute force" (55).[⤒]
- #20 In this respect Hersey concurs with one of his most prominent detractors, Dwight MacDonald, in the belief that "naturalism is no longer adequate, either esthetically or morally, to deal with modern horrors" ("Hersey's Hiroshima," Politics 10.3 [October 1946]: 308). Though MacDonald attributed what he considered Hiroshima's shortcomings to Hersey's "suave, underplayed, toned-down naturalism" (308), it seems to me that the work is better understood as a critique of such naturalism than an example of it. For an alternative take on these questions, one that praises Hersey for comprising his narrative "in large part of layer upon layer of details" and for his commitment to giving a "meticulously precise account ... of the experience of the bomb undergone by those who endured it" (223), see Georges Battaile, "Concerning the Accounts Given by the Residents of Hiroshima," in Trauma: Explorations in Memory, ed. Cathy Caruth (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 221-235. For more on the relationship between naturalism and the bomb, see Boyer, 203-210, 243-256.[⤒]
- #21 Hersey's interest in these mediating ramifications is quite thoroughgoing. In approaching Hirohito's historic announcement in part from the perspective of someone who did not hear it on the radio, and in coyly reminding us that even when the Emperor's voice finally is heard "in person" (834) it is heard through the airwaves and not the air, Hersey casts the statement as both a mediating agent and a media effect. Nuclear war's most direct result, as it were, is not carnage but mediation.[⤒]
- #22 Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), 132-133; hereafter cited in parentheses in the body of the essay.[⤒]
- #23 Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 73.[⤒]
- #24 John Lewis Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 109.[⤒]
- #25 Bernard Brodie, "Nuclear Weapons: Strategic or Tactical?" Foreign Policy 32 (January 1954): 226.[⤒]
- #26 Quoted in Gaddis, 113.[⤒]
- #27 As Schelling would put the point in another context, "a fine deterrent can make a superb target." See his foreword to Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962), viii).[⤒]
- #28 Hence, even in the midst of the American nuclear monopoly, Gaddis has noted, Kennan would speculate that a universal ban on the use of nuclear weapons would be in the nation's interest: "it would perhaps be best for this country, if it were decided that atomic bombs would never be used" (quoted in Gaddis, 113). The most thoroughgoing expression of this argument is probably Solly Zuckerman, Nuclear Illusion and Reality (New York: Viking, 1982), 15-89.[⤒]
- #29 Nuclear skeptics have long noted that the discourse surrounding nuclear weapons often obscures what would seem to be their essentially offensive and catastrophic purposes. Scoffing at the idea of an "anti-missile missile," Scarry claims for instance that "our very conception of nuclear war" is the "culmination" of a systematic "confusion" of defensive and aggressive tendencies in warfare (68). But the confusion surrounding nuclear weapons' disarming tendencies does not derive solely from our unwillingness to see that the weapons must target and threaten persons rather than other weapons. The problem is not that human beings have trouble facing the full implications of such new capacities to inflict "unprecedented injury to the human body (three hundred million people in the first exchange)"; nor is it that we refuse to see that nuclear weapons are "in fact incapable of not inflicting massive injury (if shot down outside one's own territory, they will land in someone else's territory)" (68). The confusion instead stems from the fact that within the logic of postwar nuclear discourse the most anti-missile missile is in fact exactly what Scarry claims all nuclear weapons must be: an instrument designed to wreak unprecedented devastation on human populations. The humanitarian implications of the weapon, should we allow that there are any, are built into its terroristic design.[⤒]
- #30 The unreality was all the more pronounced in Kahn's version of deterrence, which required not only that we vigilantly preserve retaliatory weapons whose use, if all went well, would be rendered irrelevant by such vigilance, but that we also assiduously construct a first strike capacity for the sake of never using it:
[It] is still important to know (abstractly, we hope) that a war in which the U. S. made the first strike would result in more favorable conditions for us than would the wars that are generally considered. And even here we are more interested in deterrence than in striking first! We are more deeply interested in what the Soviets will conclude when they ask themselves, "If we try this very provoking act, will the United States strike us?" than in speculating on what could happen to us if we should actually strike them. It is quite possible that the Soviets may conclude when contemplating action that their risks are too high (even though the fact may be that we have already concluded that would not actually dare to initiate the war). It is for such reasons that even a façade may be invaluable. Everyone knows that there is an enormous difference between a probability and a certainty. (36) [⤒]
- #31 Insofar as deterrence is based on a threat, this kind of "rub" (SMA 292) is in fact built into its basic structure. "The distinctive character of a threat," as Schelling elaborates it, "is that one asserts that he will do, in a contingency, what he manifestly would prefer not to do if the contingency occurred, the contingency being governed by the second party's behavior" (SC 123). If we merely wished to avoid the contingency, in Schelling's terms, we could "promise" retaliation in response to nuclear aggression. Since we wish to avoid our retaliation itself as well as the contingency our posture is far more ambivalent. A "promise is costly when it succeeds," Schelling explains, "and a threat is costly when it fails. A successful threat is one that is not carried out" (177). We use nuclear power "as a deterrent," to put the point in the terms John Foster Dulles used during the 1952 presidential campaign, precisely because we do not want to use it as a "means of waging war after we get into it" (quoted in Gaddis, 123).[⤒]
- #32 The virtual element of nuclear authority also ensures that our interaction with the enemy will always have an uneasily collaborative dimension. The reason military advantage accrues more to the ability to destroy than to actual destruction is that the preservation of capabilities allows a party to "retain control" of his decisions and thus to use those decisions to influence his adversary. As we might have already gathered from the way this control emerges only from restraint, though, the influence in question here is of a highly, indeed, essentially mediated character. "Wartime decisions may" in fact "be very different from those we presently like to imagine ourselves making" (294), Brodie explains. "Clausewitz's classic definition, that the object of war is to impose one's will on the enemy, must be modified, at least for any opponent who has a substantial nuclear capability behind him" (313-314). Rather, in modern nuclear war we find that our control of events on the battlefield depends on our willingness to let our enemies use our weapons to coerce us: "To retain control of decisions is to make oneself accessible to coercion concerning those decisions" (294). We have obviously traveled a pretty long way from Scarry's superpowered nuclear hegemon, so far from it, in fact, that Schelling thought that our ordinary vocabulary of opponents, allies, and partners was largely inapplicable to nuclear war: "The difficulty is in finding a sufficiently rich name for the mixed game in which there is both conflict and mutual dependence. It is interesting that we have no very good word for the relation between players: in the common-interest game we can refer to them as 'partners' and in the pure-conflict game as 'opponents' or 'adversaries'; but the mixed relation that is involved in [nuclear conflict] requires a more ambivalent term" (SC 89).[⤒]
- #33 The strategic status of enemy cities became a critical flashpoint in the nuclear debates of the late 1950s and early 1960s, in part because some analysts thought that it would be wise to devote any initial retaliatory strike to the enemy's military installations rather than his population. Such counterforce operations would have eased the psychological paralysis Kissinger and others saw creeping into American strategy by way of doctrines of massive retaliation. As Schelling noted parenthetically, counterforce "can also, with no loss of manliness, be recognized as an effort to keep from killing tens of millions of people whose guilt, if any, is hardly commensurate with their obliteration" (AI 193-194). But Brodie's suggestion here could much more easily be described as pro-city than counter-force. And what is merely implicit in Strategy in the Missile Age would be quite explicit in Arms and Influence, where Schelling praised the counterforce strategy floated in Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's June 1962 commencement address at the University of Michigan for "at last recogniz[ing] the importance of cities--of people and their means of livelihood--and propos[ing] to pay attention to them in the event of war" (191). For Schelling counterforce was a way of addressing cities rather than avoiding them: "The ideas that Secretary McNamara expressed ... have been occasionally called ... the 'no cities strategy.' As good a name would be 'cities strategy'" (190). "The counterforce idea is not simply that one has to shoot something," he explained, "and if cities are off limits one seeks 'legitimate' targets in order to go ahead with a noisy war" (193). Rather, the counterforce idea would recognize that cities are useful to the extent that they remain extant. Ultimately, Schelling would even go so far as to reverse the causal relationship implied by the ordinary versions of counterforce. In his mind counterforce does not lead to the protection of cities; rather the protection of cities leads to counterforce: "The 'counterforce' idea involves the destruction of enemy weapons so that he cannot shoot us even if he wants to. The 'cities' idea is intended to provide him incentive not to shoot us even if he has the weapons to do it" (193-194).[⤒]
- #34 Schelling's rhetoric here almost directly tracks Battaille's observation that the deployment of an atom bomb is "a means of action" (226), rather than an action in and of itself, because its "goal is to impose, by fear, the will of the one who provokes it" (226). Battaille leaves more or less unexplored the question at the heart of Arms and Influence, namely how exactly one could use fear to impose his will.[⤒]
- #35 In his Nobel Lecture Schelling would casually propose that, "There has never been any doubt about the military effectiveness of nuclear weapons or their potential for terror" (247). But from the perspective of his nuclear theory from the later 1950s and early 1960s, these weapons' "military effectiveness," if it should even be called as much, simply is "their potential for terror."[⤒]
- #36 It might make more sense to make this point from the other direction, and to say that Schelling thinks that nations once pursued wars precisely so as to be able to derive influence from latent force. On the traditional model, as Schelling sees it, the point of war is to achieve, or to prevent someone else from achieving, the overwhelming hurting power inherent in nuclear weapons from the outset: "Once the army has been defeated in the clean war, the victorious enemy can be as brutally coercive as he wishes. A clean war would determine which side gets to use its power to hurt coercively after victory, and it is likely to be worth some violence to avoid being the loser" (AI 30). Nuclear weapons thus "reverse[]" the "sequence of war": "Instead of destroying enemy forces as a prelude to imposing one's will on the enemy nation, one would have to destroy the nation as a means or a prelude to destroying the enemy forces" (23). Insofar as "Victory is no longer a prerequisite for hurting the enemy" (22), war has lost its instrumental relation to any resolution of a given conflict; the relationship between the pain it entails and its results begins to look essentially arbitrary:
Deterrence rests today on the threat of pain and extinction, not just the threat of military defeat. We may argue about the wisdom of announcing "unconditional surrender" as an aim in the last major war, but seem to expect "unconditional destruction" as a matter of course in another one.
Something like the same destruction always could be done. With nuclear weapons there is an expectation that it would be done. It is not "overkill" that is new.... What is new is plain "kill"—the idea that major war might just be a contest in the killing of countries, or not even a contest but just two parallel exercises in devastation. (23)
From his vantage, what Scarry calls "the structure of war" could be more properly identified as the structure of nuclear war. It is only with the advent of nuclear weapons that military confrontation could emerge as "contest in killing" rather than a struggle for power.[⤒]
- #37 This is not to say, of course, that it is not quite easy to find military officials evincing concern throughout the 1950s and early 1960s that, as Dulles put the point in a discussion with Eisenhower in March 1953, "we are spending such vast sums on the production of weapons we cannot use" (quoted in Tannenwald, 150). Kissinger's Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy was merely the most prominent of a whole swath of texts designed to put the nation's "doctrine" back "on the only sound basis: a realization that the task of strategy is not simply to provide the tools of war but also to utilize these tools for the purpose of war" (423). Such a project would only seem urgent, though, if war were a purpose itself rather than a way of pursuing one; it would only seem urgent, that is, within a "notion of power" so "literal" or "abstract" (40) as to preclude the possibility of "an effective relationship between force and diplomacy" (40). To say that nuclear weapons were not utilized for the purpose of war is not quite to say that they were not used at all.[⤒]
- #38 Schelling, "Nobel Lecture," 247.[⤒]
- #39 I take this unused violence to be Schelling's version of what would become "anticipatory injury" in The Body in Pain, an injury that is insistently "actual" (80) even if it is not clearly empirical (at least not in the materialist terms in which Scarry generally operates).[⤒]
- #40 Schelling's notion that "there is an idiom" (146-147) in military interaction, so that violence itself would "communicate" "more violence," obviously conjures a world in which military activity could be understood in essentially linguistic terms (a military exchange in the nuclear period, he would suggest, could often be judged as an "expressive bit of repartee" and would need to be assessed in "aesthetic" terms [142]). It also invokes a distinctive, and historically significant, communicative medium--one in which the idiom of expression would not necessarily bear only an arbitrary relation to the message it transmitted (by communicating in "deed rather than words, or deed in addition to words" the nuclear state will keep its messages in "the same currency" as its media, Schelling would maintain [146-147]). At roughly the same moment Roland Barthes would locate exactly the same prospect in the photograph, which occasions for him "a decisive mutation of informational economies" (45) in its "special status" as "a message without a code" (17). The interest of the photograph in essays such as "The Photographic Message" (1961) and "Rhetoric of the Image" (1964) lies precisely in its raising the prospect of "an analogical 'code' (as opposed to a digital one)" (32). Because there is "no necessity to set up a relay . . . between the object and its image" the photograph offered the prospect of a "continuous message" rather than a conventionally linguistic one (17). From this vantage we might begin to think that the persistent association of nuclear warfare with Chow's casually deployed category of "mimetic representation" (26) stems from the bomb's semiotic novelty as much as from its curious strategic capacities in the era of the nuclear taboo--though, needless to say, a full elaboration of this prospect and of its implications lies beyond the scope of my concerns here. (The Barthes quotations come from Barthes, Image, Music, Text, trans. Stephen Heath [New York: Hill and Wang, 1977].) [⤒]
- #41 Nadel, 65.[⤒]
- #42 Something further clouds the relations between the text's two little boys: the code-name of the atomic bomb deployed on August 6, 1945 would not become a matter of broad public knowledge until some twenty years after Hiroshima's publication. There are good extra-textual reasons to think that Hersey himself was aware of the appellation. Having sprung from institutional center of the emerging American intelligence state, not just from Yale but from Skull and Bones itself, he trafficked comfortably among those for whom such data might be open secrets. His chief literary and media mentor, after all, was Henry Luce. And there are even better internal textual reasons for making the connection. Toshio haunts the moments of Hiroshima's most direct engagement with the symbolic and mediated dimensions of the bomb's power. Given that children find it difficult to "sustain a sense of the tragedy," Toshio's named appearance in the midst of Hersey's account of the relations between symbolism and the Japanese surrender and in the midst of the work's closing paragraphs feels awfully emphatic. This little boy commands our attention precisely where the relations between the bomb and Little Boy would seem most pressing. I would like to think that Hersey coded these passages with a view to a moment of future recognition in which the connection would harmoniously underscore the notion of virtual nuclear power whose emergence I have been tracing over the course of Hiroshima. Or that he offered these sequences for future readers coming to Hiroshima after the forms of non-use Hersey had begun to discover in nuclear Hiroshima had turned into the tradition Schelling celebrates or the terror Chow condemns. But I could hardly insist upon such a reading. Hersey said nothing about the bomb's name; so far as I can tell, he was never even asked about it. And even had he confirmed my speculations in a later interview, he would have only undermined exactly what makes Hiroshima compelling--the work's insistent inability, or refusal, to keep its allegorical and empirical registers separate from one another. Whether we are encountering an inability or a refusal is precisely the point--one can never be entirely certain that Hersey is revealing something about the bomb or whether the bomb is revealing itself in his account of it. However compelling we might find a reading of Hiroshima as a depiction of the abstraction of nuclear warfare, we could never quite deny that the text advances such a project only indirectly and equivocally. It is precisely by making the question of the bomb's status undecidable that Hersey most clearly anticipates the world of Schelling's unused nuclear violence and its tradition of spectacular non-events.[⤒]
- #43 Quoted in Brodie, Absolute Weapon, 73.[⤒]